Articles
‘How Literature Educates the Emotions’, Philosophia Christi 25:1, (2023): 7-26.
‘A Novels Spiritual Discipline: Literature and the Renewal of the Mind’, Journal of Spiritual Formation and Soul Care 15:2, (2022): 205-23.
‘Freedom Is not Compatible with Determinism’, Problems in Philosophy: An Introduction to the Major Debates on Knowledge, Reality, Values, and Government, ed. Steven B. Cowan. London: Bloomsbury Publishing (2020): 316-326.
‘The Heart of Libertarianism: Fundamentality and the Will’, Social Philosophy and Policy 36:1, (2019): 72-92. (Penultimate draft available here.)
‘Free Will’ (with Timothy O'Connor) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta.
‘Cares, Identification, and Agency Reductionism’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98:S1, (2017): 577–98. (Penultimate draft available here.)
‘Bratman on Identity over Time and Identification at a Time’, Philosophical Explorations 21:1, (2017): 1-14. (Penultimate draft available here.)
‘If Anyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist, then Everyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist’, Mind 125:500, (2016): 1101-1131. (Penultimate draft available here.)
‘The Luck and Mind Arguments’, The Routledge Companion to Free Will, eds. Meghan Griffith, Neil Levy, and Kevin Timpe. New York: Routledge, (2016): 203–212. (Penultimate draft here)
‘Self-Determination, Self-Transformation, and the Case of Jean Valjean: A Problem for Velleman’, Philosophical Studies 172:10, (2015): 2591-2598. (Penultimate draft available here.)
‘Everyone Thinks that an Ability to Do Otherwise Is Necessary for Moral Responsibility’, Philosophical Studies 172:8, (2015): 2091-2107. (Penultimate draft available here.)
‘Agent-Causation, Explanation, and Akrasia: A Reply to Levy's Hard Luck’, Criminal Law and Philosophy 9:4, (2015): 753-770. (Penultimate draft available here.)
‘Powers, Necessity, and Determinism’, Thought 3:3, (2014): 225-229. (Penultimate draft available here.)
‘Event-Causal Libertarianism, Functional Reduction, and the Disappearing Agent Argument’, Philosophical Studies 170:3, (2014): 413-432. (Penultimate draft available here.)
‘Valuing Blame’, Blame: Its Nature and Norms, eds. D. Justin Coates and Neal A. Tognazzini. New York: Oxford University Press, (2013): 207-223.
‘The Scientific Plausibility of Libertarianism’, Free Will and Moral Responsibility, eds. Ishtiyaque Haji and Justin Caouette. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing (2013): 123-141. (Penultimate draft here)
‘A Theory of the Normative Force of Pleas’, Philosophical Studies 163:2, (2013): 479-502. (Penultimate draft available here.)
‘How Should Libertarians Conceive of the Location and Role of Indeterminism?’, Philosophical Explorations 16:1, (2013): 44-58. (Penultimate draft available here.)
‘The Assimilation Argument and the Rollback Argument’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93:3, (2012): 395-416. (Penultimate draft here)
‘The Problem of Enhanced Control’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89:4, (2011): 687-706. (Penultimate draft here)
‘Farewell to the Luck (and Mind) Argument’, Philosophical Studies 156:2, (2011): 199–230. (Publisher's link to open access)
‘Neo-Frankfurtians and Buffer Cases: The New Challenge to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities’, Philosophical Studies 152:2, (2011): 189–207. (Publisher's link to open access)
‘Masks, Abilities, and Opportunities: Why the New Dispositionalism Cannot Succeed’, The Modern Schoolman (now Res Philosophica) 88:1&2, (2011): 89-103. (Special issue on Free Will and Moral Responsibility). (Publisher's link to open access)
Book Reviews
Review of Causation and Free Will, by Carolina Sartorio, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 9.21.2016. (open access)
Review of Mind, Brain, and Free Will, by Richard Swinburne, Philosophical Review 124:2, (2015): 255-258.
Review of Causes, Laws, and Free Will: Why Determinism Doesn’t Matter, by Kadri Vihvelin, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 10.19.2013. (open access)
Review of Reason’s Debt to Freedom: Normative Appraisals, Reasons, and Free Will, by Ishtiyaque Haji, Ethics 123:3, (2013): 563–567.
Review of Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action, by Jesús H. Aguilar and Andrei A. Buckareff, Philosophy in Review 33:1, (2013): 1–3. (open access)
‘How Literature Educates the Emotions’, Philosophia Christi 25:1, (2023): 7-26.
‘A Novels Spiritual Discipline: Literature and the Renewal of the Mind’, Journal of Spiritual Formation and Soul Care 15:2, (2022): 205-23.
‘Freedom Is not Compatible with Determinism’, Problems in Philosophy: An Introduction to the Major Debates on Knowledge, Reality, Values, and Government, ed. Steven B. Cowan. London: Bloomsbury Publishing (2020): 316-326.
‘The Heart of Libertarianism: Fundamentality and the Will’, Social Philosophy and Policy 36:1, (2019): 72-92. (Penultimate draft available here.)
‘Free Will’ (with Timothy O'Connor) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta.
‘Cares, Identification, and Agency Reductionism’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98:S1, (2017): 577–98. (Penultimate draft available here.)
‘Bratman on Identity over Time and Identification at a Time’, Philosophical Explorations 21:1, (2017): 1-14. (Penultimate draft available here.)
‘If Anyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist, then Everyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist’, Mind 125:500, (2016): 1101-1131. (Penultimate draft available here.)
‘The Luck and Mind Arguments’, The Routledge Companion to Free Will, eds. Meghan Griffith, Neil Levy, and Kevin Timpe. New York: Routledge, (2016): 203–212. (Penultimate draft here)
‘Self-Determination, Self-Transformation, and the Case of Jean Valjean: A Problem for Velleman’, Philosophical Studies 172:10, (2015): 2591-2598. (Penultimate draft available here.)
‘Everyone Thinks that an Ability to Do Otherwise Is Necessary for Moral Responsibility’, Philosophical Studies 172:8, (2015): 2091-2107. (Penultimate draft available here.)
‘Agent-Causation, Explanation, and Akrasia: A Reply to Levy's Hard Luck’, Criminal Law and Philosophy 9:4, (2015): 753-770. (Penultimate draft available here.)
‘Powers, Necessity, and Determinism’, Thought 3:3, (2014): 225-229. (Penultimate draft available here.)
‘Event-Causal Libertarianism, Functional Reduction, and the Disappearing Agent Argument’, Philosophical Studies 170:3, (2014): 413-432. (Penultimate draft available here.)
‘Valuing Blame’, Blame: Its Nature and Norms, eds. D. Justin Coates and Neal A. Tognazzini. New York: Oxford University Press, (2013): 207-223.
‘The Scientific Plausibility of Libertarianism’, Free Will and Moral Responsibility, eds. Ishtiyaque Haji and Justin Caouette. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing (2013): 123-141. (Penultimate draft here)
‘A Theory of the Normative Force of Pleas’, Philosophical Studies 163:2, (2013): 479-502. (Penultimate draft available here.)
‘How Should Libertarians Conceive of the Location and Role of Indeterminism?’, Philosophical Explorations 16:1, (2013): 44-58. (Penultimate draft available here.)
‘The Assimilation Argument and the Rollback Argument’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93:3, (2012): 395-416. (Penultimate draft here)
‘The Problem of Enhanced Control’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89:4, (2011): 687-706. (Penultimate draft here)
‘Farewell to the Luck (and Mind) Argument’, Philosophical Studies 156:2, (2011): 199–230. (Publisher's link to open access)
‘Neo-Frankfurtians and Buffer Cases: The New Challenge to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities’, Philosophical Studies 152:2, (2011): 189–207. (Publisher's link to open access)
‘Masks, Abilities, and Opportunities: Why the New Dispositionalism Cannot Succeed’, The Modern Schoolman (now Res Philosophica) 88:1&2, (2011): 89-103. (Special issue on Free Will and Moral Responsibility). (Publisher's link to open access)
Book Reviews
Review of Causation and Free Will, by Carolina Sartorio, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 9.21.2016. (open access)
Review of Mind, Brain, and Free Will, by Richard Swinburne, Philosophical Review 124:2, (2015): 255-258.
Review of Causes, Laws, and Free Will: Why Determinism Doesn’t Matter, by Kadri Vihvelin, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 10.19.2013. (open access)
Review of Reason’s Debt to Freedom: Normative Appraisals, Reasons, and Free Will, by Ishtiyaque Haji, Ethics 123:3, (2013): 563–567.
Review of Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action, by Jesús H. Aguilar and Andrei A. Buckareff, Philosophy in Review 33:1, (2013): 1–3. (open access)