My primary research is in the ethics and metaphysics of agency, especially issues concerning free will, moral responsibility, the self, motivation, blame, ability, causation, indeterminism, and reductionism.
Much of my published work concerns the tenability of event-causal libertarianism, which seeks to develop a libertarian conception of free will and moral responsibility within an agency reductionist framework (i.e. the causal theory of action). Most philosophers contend that event-causal libertarianism is a failed attempt to domesticate libertarianism, an untenable combination of compatibilism’s aspiration to naturalistic plausibility (scientific image) and libertarianism’s aspiration to capture our intuitive conception of ourselves (manifest image). Many of my papers respond to this worry, arguing that event-causal libertarianism is a far more powerful theory than many have realized. I am working the various strands of these papers together into a book-length, qualified defense of event-causal libertarianism--tentatively titled A Minimal Libertarianism: Free Will and the Promise of Reduction.
It is a qualified defense because I assume rather than defend agency reductionism. The idea behind the book is: assume agency reductionism and see how far it can take us. My conclusion is that it can take us quite far: we can construct a powerful libertarian model of freedom within that framework that silences the main objections to libertarianism.
However, in the final chapter I offer some reason to doubt agency reductionism's ultimate tenability, at least for building a viable account of free will and moral responsibility. My worry about the tenability of agency reductionism has nothing to do with compatibilism or libertarianism or indeterminism or determinism, but with reductionism itself, and specifically whether it can account for self-determination. If this worry proves sound, then it turns out not only that event-causal libertarianism is untenable but also event-causal compatibilism. Thus the prospect of a tenable reductive libertarian model has far greater import than most realize.
Other issues I have been thinking about lot concern the relationship between the self and motivation, the nature of the will, and the ethics of blame and forgiveness.
Information about my published papers, including links where possible, appear under the papers page. Questions and comments are warmly welcome.
Much of my published work concerns the tenability of event-causal libertarianism, which seeks to develop a libertarian conception of free will and moral responsibility within an agency reductionist framework (i.e. the causal theory of action). Most philosophers contend that event-causal libertarianism is a failed attempt to domesticate libertarianism, an untenable combination of compatibilism’s aspiration to naturalistic plausibility (scientific image) and libertarianism’s aspiration to capture our intuitive conception of ourselves (manifest image). Many of my papers respond to this worry, arguing that event-causal libertarianism is a far more powerful theory than many have realized. I am working the various strands of these papers together into a book-length, qualified defense of event-causal libertarianism--tentatively titled A Minimal Libertarianism: Free Will and the Promise of Reduction.
It is a qualified defense because I assume rather than defend agency reductionism. The idea behind the book is: assume agency reductionism and see how far it can take us. My conclusion is that it can take us quite far: we can construct a powerful libertarian model of freedom within that framework that silences the main objections to libertarianism.
However, in the final chapter I offer some reason to doubt agency reductionism's ultimate tenability, at least for building a viable account of free will and moral responsibility. My worry about the tenability of agency reductionism has nothing to do with compatibilism or libertarianism or indeterminism or determinism, but with reductionism itself, and specifically whether it can account for self-determination. If this worry proves sound, then it turns out not only that event-causal libertarianism is untenable but also event-causal compatibilism. Thus the prospect of a tenable reductive libertarian model has far greater import than most realize.
Other issues I have been thinking about lot concern the relationship between the self and motivation, the nature of the will, and the ethics of blame and forgiveness.
Information about my published papers, including links where possible, appear under the papers page. Questions and comments are warmly welcome.